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Abstract  
 
The Obama administration‘s intervention in UN resolutions on Palestine was inevitable and it 
did have many implications for the process of finding a suitable solution for the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. This intervention took various forms and also went through different 
frequencies depending on the general political context and some other factors; such as the 
pressure exerted by the American pro-Israel lobbying groups. From this perspective, this 
thesis demonstrates how extensively the Obama administration opposed UN resolutions 
related to Palestine; especially during the first term (2009-2012), and also outlines the 
changes in Obama‘s UN policy toward Palestine during his second term (2013-2016). The 
major focus in this thesis is UN resolutions on Israeli settlements and Palestine‘s UN 
membership. 
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 لمتحذة المتعلقة بذولة فلسطينفي قرارت الأمم ا إدارة أوباماتذخل 
 
 إعذاد:
 رنا خالذ قاسم زكارنه
 
 إشراف: 
 د. محمذ أبو كوش
 
 الملخص
يٍ الاَعكاساث انعذٍذ  وَجى عُّ، ا  حتًَ ا  فهسطٍَ أيز انًتعهقت بذونتتذخم إدارة أوبايا فٌ قزاراث الأيى انًتحذة  نقذ كاٌ
 وتأثز بعذة عوايم يختهفت  أشكالا  اتخذ ْذا انتذخم كًا سزائَهٌ. الإ - إٍجاد حم عًهٌ نهصزاع انفهسطٌَُ عهي عًهَت
ًوانَت ؛ يثم انضغظ انذً تى تُفَذِ يٍ قبم جًاعاث انضغظ الأيزٍكَت انسَاسٌ انعاو وبعض انعوايم الأخزىانسَاق انك
الأيى انًتحذة انًتعهقت  قزاراثنبعض إدارة أوبايا يعارضت ْذِ انزسانت يذى قوة  توضح، لإسزائَم. يٍ ْذا انًُظور
الأيى  فٌَزاث فٌ سَاست أوبايا انتغ أٍضا   وضحت)، كًا 9209-2009( فتزة انزئاست الأونيلا سًَا خلال و ،بفهسطٍَ
قزاراث الأيى عهي فٌ ْذِ انزسانت  وٍصب انتزكَز). 2209-2209انثاََت ( انزئاستخلال فتزة تجاِ فهسطٍَ انًتحذة 
 عضوٍت فهسطٍَ فٌ الأيى انًتحذة.وانًستوطُاث الإسزائَهَت  فٌ يجانٍَ رئَسٍََ وًْا: انًتحذة 
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I. General Framework of the Research  
A. Introduction 
 The US had a considerable influence over UN resolutions on Palestine during 
Obama‘s presidency (2009-2016). This influence affected the Question of Palestine and also 
caused a delay in Palestine‘s status upgrade in the UN. However, few changes occurred 
during Obama‘s second term (2012-2016) with regards to the approach adopted by his 
administration at the UN; turning it from a one-sided policy that mainly supports Israel 
(during the first term) to another one that takes into consideration the concerns of the 
Palestinian side. Therefore, studying the evolution of the Obama Administration‘s 
intervention in the UN is essential toward understanding how the international system 
represented by the UN reacted toward issues related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
 For many years, the US had a major role in interfering in the work of the UN on 
different levels; starting from the point of the establishment of the UN, to interfering in the 
process of drafting and voting for resolutions on different matters. Thus, in order to fully 
understand the overall influence of Obama‘s administration on UN issues related to Palestine, 
there is a need to tackle the factors that shape the American UN policy, Obama‘s policy in 
particular. These factors may vary based on their source; whether it is domestic or foreign. 
They are also affected by the political context and the internal and/or external pressure.  
 Taking all these factors into consideration, this thesis aims at outlining the Obama 
Administration‘s influence on some specific UN agenda on Palestine. It focuses on specific 
UN documents: SC draft resolution S/2011/24, Palestine‘s application for UN membership, 
GA resolution 67/19, and SC resolution 2334. Analyzing these documents from both the 
political and legal aspects will be the key to understand the American attitude toward them, 
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in addition to studying the language used in Obama‘s speeches and comparing it to other 
famous speeches by Jewish leaders. For instance, the US has interfered in Palestine‘s UN 
status for many years, causing a delay in obtaining the non-member observer status, and 
blocking Palestine‘s attempts to gain its full UN membership. This American attitude is 
basically a result of different motives that occurred as a result of a specific political context. 
Therefore, this thesis aims at answering questions regarding Obama‘s intervention in UN 
issues related to Palestine, by first providing a brief description of the general frame work of 
the UN, GA and SC in particular, secondly by shedding a light on the dimensions of the 
Obama administration‘s UN policy on Palestine, including the impact of Trump‘s election. 
 
B. Thesis Problem 
 This thesis will investigate the changes in the Obama administration‘s attitude at the 
UN regarding issues related to Palestine; particularly the issue of Palestine‘s UN membership 
and Israeli settlement expansion.  
 
C. Thesis Questions        
 This thesis mainly aims at answering the following questions: 
1. What is the core work of the UN and its two main organs; the GA and SC? 
2. How does voting take place at the UN? 
3. How much influence does the US have on UN resolutions regarding Palestine?  
4. Did Obama try to help resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict through the UN? 
5. How much influence did the American pro-Israel lobbying groups have on 
Obama‘s UN policy? 
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6. What influence did the election of Trump have on Obama‘s UN policy during 
his second term? 
 
D. Significance of Study 
 This study is important for it will provide a comprehensive review of Obama‘s 
intervention in UN resolutions on Palestine when it comes to Israeli Settlements and 
Palestine‘s UN membership. In addition, the study will look into the main differences 
between Obama‘s UN policy during his first term and during his second term; in light of the 
influence of some major political factors.  
 
E. Hypotheses   
1. If a SC draft resolution is lawful but against the interests of the US or its allies, an 
American veto will be the reaction thereto.  
2. The US does influence the attitude of other states at the SC. 
3. The political context affects the American attitude at the UN. 
4. Obama‘s stated policy regarding solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is 
contradicted by his administration‘s actions on the ground. 
5. Obama‘s policy during his second term was critical of Israel. 
6. The election of Trump influenced Obama to take decisions in favor of Palestine. 
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F. Thesis Objectives 
 The main goal of the thesis is to develop an approach of the American influence on 
the UN core duties and procedures during Obama Administration (2009-2016) when it comes 
to resolutions on Palestine. The other objective of the current thesis is to provide a 
comprehensive review of some UN resolutions concerning the question of Palestine, and the 
role the Obama Administration played in either blocking or passing them. The selected 
documents to be studied represent two important issues; Palestine‘s status in the UN and 
Israeli settlements. Moreover, this thesis aims at demonstrating the changes in the Obama 
Administration‘s attitude in terms of the political context of these resolutions, as well as the 
influence of the American pro-Israel lobbying groups. In particular, this thesis has the 
following significant sub-objectives: 
1. To provide a basic overview of the UN work and the voting system in the GA 
and SC. 
2. To review historical milestones in the US-Palestine relationship at the UN. 
3. To outline the Obama Administration‘s influence over UN resolutions on 
Palestine. 
4. To analyze the legal framework and the political context of some UN resolutions 
during the Obama Administration, as well as the language used in the texts of 
each document. 
5. To review the different variables that led the Obama Administration to behave in 
a certain manner toward these UN resolutions; including the political context, 
specific moral standards, and the influence of the American pro-Israel lobbying 
groups. 
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G. Research Methodology  
 The main research method for this thesis is the analytical review of some UN-related 
documents: specific UN resolutions on Palestine, Obama‘s speeches at the UN, few other 
speeches at the UN as well as other political events. In addition, this thesis uses previous 
literature on the general work of the GA and SC including the mechanism of adopting UN 
resolutions, as well as the history of US-Palestine relations at the UN, with a major focus on 
the Obama Administration‘s influence over UN resolutions on Palestine. This thesis was also 
implemented through conducting personal interviews with Palestinian and American 
politicians and analyzing their opinions in light of the political context and the language used 
in UN resolutions and speeches. The interviewees are: 
In Palestine: 
 Dr. Nabil Shaath (Advisor to Palestine‘s President on Foreign Affairs and 
International Relations). 
 Ambassador Fida Abdelhadi (Deputy Permanent Observer of the State of 
Palestine to the United Nations).  
In the US: 
 Payton Knopf (Former Spokesman at the US Mission to the UN under then-
Ambassador Susan E. Rice). 
 Dr. Abdelhamid Siyam (Former UN Spokesman and Chief of UN Arabic Radio, 
currently Lecturer at the Center for ME Studies at Rutgers University). 
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H. Literature Review 
 The American intervention in UN resolutions on Palestine is inevitable and it occurs 
as a result of many factors. This thesis aims to shed light on this subject by focusing on the 
Obama administration and the role it played in influencing UN resolution related to Palestine. 
In order to do so, UN documents will be studied as well as previous scholarly work. These 
sources vary from covering the basics of the UN work and its voting system, to discussing the 
history of the of the American intervention in the UN with a particular focus on the Obama 
administration‘s intervention, and the reasons that caused this intervention.  
 The core work of the UN is very clear as mentioned in its Charter (1945), which 
provides a comprehensive overview of the purposes and principles of the UN, as an 
organization aimed at creating a better world. The UN Charter does provide a detailed 
description of the UN organs, as well as specifying the procedures by which states join the 
organization as members, and the responsibilities they have to fulfill as a result of their 
membership. This Charter stands as the basic source, which this thesis draws on while trying 
to explain specific UN procedures and the American intervention with them. Similarly, the 
UN website provides insights on the structure of the UN and a thorough description of the 
different functions the UN organs perform, which helps understanding the differences 
between the GA and the SC; as they are the major focus of this thesis.  
 Therefore, explaining the structure of both the GA and SC, as well as their work 
mechanism is necessary for understating the way the US attempts to interfere in them. 
Keohane (1966) and Lall (1975) described the nature of procedures implemented at the GA 
and how states deal with them from a political perspective. Thus, they discussed how states 
negotiate certain procedures and use the GA as an umbrella for implementing specific 
political agreements. This behavior, as useful as it might be, may also have negative 
consequences as Lall (1975) argued that the GA ―succeeds as a negotiating forum only when 
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the process of diplomacy takes on a conciliatory tone which assures that all parties involved 
feel their interests are taken into account‖ (p. 63). Hence, this provides hints on the 
possibility of finding two sides to each action taken in the UN.  
 On the other hand, Gruenberg (2009) presented the process of finalizing SC 
resolutions and how states get affected by them, especially when there is consensus among 
the SC members except for one that chooses to use its veto. The latter is explained in the UN 
Charter, and also through the Security Council Report Website (2017), which provides 
detailed information on all vetoes. This was helpful in recognizing the American vetoes each 
by its year and subject. In addition, Brazys & Panke (2017) explained the voting system at 
the UN and how states attempt to use informal ways to gain the needed votes. A special focus 
on that was provided by Alexander & Rooney (2017), who discussed the American 
experience in buying votes at the UN. Moreover, Hwang, Sanford and Lee (2015) propose 
that temporary members of the SC receive favorable treatment from the IMF, the World 
Bank, or the US foreign aid in exchange for their political support for the permanent member, 
the US, and that the distribution of foreign aid is strongly influenced by donors‘ political 
desire to draw cooperation from recipient countries. This leads to question the reliability of 
the work of the UN as well as the states that follow this path while dealing with other states. 
 The US-Palestine relationship at the UN has some specific historical milestones, 
which are well explained by Chamberlin (2015) through illustrating the context of Yassir 
Arafat‘s GA speech in 1974 and its implications. In addition, Anderson (1990) described the 
UN events of 1988, when Arafat addressed the GA and the US opposed his speech. Anderson 
also outlined how the Swedish government was involved in indirectly connecting the 
Palestinian and American governments to talk. Sarsar (2004) also stressed on the fact that the 
US had its own interventions in UN resolutions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, starting 
from 1947 and the passage of GA resolution 181 on the partition plan of Palestine. On the 
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other hand, Voeten (2015), Walt (2016) and Prifti (2017) explained Obama‘s attitude toward 
Palestine from a perspective focused on specific theories of international relations; Realism 
and Liberalism. The authors had different opinions on that since they described different 
political events, which led Obama to behave in different ways; through following the most 
suitable theory of international relations at every political endeavor.  
 Hence, Obama’s UN policy during his first term differs from the policy he adopted 
during his second term on various levels. To illustrate this, Anderson (2012) argued that the 
US policy during Obama Administration was focused on expanding the notions of 
engagement and multilateralism, but only through the UN, not all international organizations. 
The Author stressed on the fact that Obama‘s policy was polarized, partisan, and also 
contradictory since it always aimed at engaging in the GA and SC, but to obstruct the main 
vehicle of UN values, leading to weaken the American influence. Moreover, Hammond 
(2016) discussed Obama‘s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict regarding the two-state 
solution and the Israeli settlements expansion. The author condemned how Obama worked 
toward maintaining the security of Israeli settlements, in contrary to his stated belief that they 
stand as an obstacle to resolving the conflict. Hammond‘s outlining of Obama‘s intervention 
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is well-explained and clearly documented; since it provides 
fundamental insights on Obama‘s policies and his failure at solving the conflict. In addition, 
Hammond‘s focus on the different factors that prevented ending the conflict-- despite the fact 
that both Israel and Palestine declared their wish to obtain peace, provides hints on a possible 
approach to be followed by future leaders to help end the conflict. In addition, Rosen (2011) 
explained the relationship between Obama and the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 
with regards to the Palestinian attempts to secure a UN recognition of Palestine as a state 
back in 2011, and how the Obama administration opposed the UN bid. The author also 
described how Abbas and the Palestinian Authority thought that the peace process did not 
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result in the needed peace, and that is why the Palestinian leadership decided to go to the UN 
and pursue the full membership. On the other hand, Prifti (2017) elaborated the differences 
between Obama‘s promises and his real actions, in attempts to explain the contradiction in 
Obama‘s policy during his first term.  
 Obama’s UN policy during his second term was slightly different in terms of the 
approach Obama adopted. Terry (2017) discussed that the changes in Obama‘s policy in his 
second term happened due to different factors including Netanyahu‘s bitterness over the Iran 
deal and his anger over Obama‘s attempted rapprochement with the Palestinians. One major 
milestone occurred on December 21, 2016, when Obama abstained on (SC resolution 2334) 
that called for a halt to all Israeli settlements, emphasizing that existing settlements have no 
legal validity and are a clear violation of international law. Moreover, Freedman (2017) 
explained how Obama aimed at preventing the construction of Jewish housing in East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank, which weakened the US-Israeli relationship, and led to the US 
abstaining on SC resolution 2334, in contrary to vetoing previous resolutions critical of 
Israel. Judis (2014) also explained how the Obama administration was not satisfied with the 
continued Israeli settlement expansion and thus it became critical of the Israeli government. 
Metz (2017) and Welsh (2017) shed the light on the fact that the election of Trump affected 
Obama‘s policy and directed him to be more supportive of Palestine. The authors argued that 
Trump‘s ceaseless attempts to criticize Obama‘s policy as well as his promises to fully 
support Israel might have influenced Obama to impose specific changes on his policy toward 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One of those changes is mentioned by Welsh (2016), as he 
discussed Obama‘s decision to sign a six-month extension of the presidential override to 
prevent the implementation of a Congressional mandate on moving the US embassy from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem, since this was among the many promises declared by Trump during his 
presidential campaign.   
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 In order to better explain the Obama administration‘s intervention in UN resolution 
related to Palestine, specific UN documents need to be outlined and thoroughly discussed, 
and the primary focus of this thesis is two major issues: Palestine‘s UN membership and 
Israeli settlements. Application of the State of Palestine for admission to UN membership is 
one major document for it contains specific language that was written with careful attention 
to the international law and previous UN resolutions. This fact opened the door to question 
the refusal the application received from the Obama administration, as well as the American 
negative vote on GA resolution (67/19), even though the majority of states voted in favor and 
thus resolution (67/19) was adopted and granted Palestine a non-member observer status in 
the UN. In addition, few other GA resolutions need to be discussed to further explain the 
American intervention in resolutions on Palestine. One of these GA resolutions is resolution 
337 (uniting for peace), which explains a crucial exception in the core work of the SC; as this 
resolution grants the GA the ability to interfere in security issues in case the SC fails to fulfill 
its duties. In addition, GA resolutions 3236 and 3237 of 1974 were adopted despite the 
American negative vote. Their importance comes due to the fact that they made the PLO an 
internationally accepted organization representing the Palestinian people, since resolution 
3237 includes granting the PLO the UN observer status. The last GA resolution to be focused 
on through this thesis is 43/177, which was adopted in 1988 and it ―acknowledges the 
proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National Council on 15 November 
1988." All these GA resolutions help draw the full picture of the Palestinian journey at the 
UN, and discussing the language used in them and the political context will help fulfill the 
overall aim of this thesis.  
 In addition, some SC resolutions on Palestine will also be studied in order to discuss 
the way the Obama administration reacted toward them. Three major SC resolutions on 
Palestine were adopted: 446, 465 and 2334. The first two were adopted during Jimmy 
 11 
 
Carter‘s presidency and the last one during Obama‘s presidency, but all of them discussed the 
issue of Israeli settlements. On the other hand, this thesis discusses another six SC draft 
resolutions on Palestine, which were all vetoed by the US. In 1997, the SC failed to adopt 
two draft resolutions on Israeli settlements: 199 and 241, as well as SC draft resolution 24 in 
2011; due to the American veto, in addition to SC draft resolution S/2014/916. The latter two 
resolutions were tabled during Obama‘s presidency; therefore, studying them will help 
explain Obama‘s UN policy toward Palestine. Also, other SC draft resolutions are reviewed: 
S/2017/1060 and S/2018/516; in order to give an overall glance on the American intervention 
in issues related to Palestine. Furthermore, this thesis depends on few UN press releases and 
meeting coverage documents, for the purpose of containing detailed information on the way 
by which states reacted to certain draft resolutions. 
 Most importantly, analyzing Obama’s speeches is necessary to understand his 
administration‘s attitude toward Palestine and the factors that shaped that attitude. Thus, 
studying Obama‘s speeches, each in its own political context, gives insights into the 
announced American policy during the Obama administration, and also helps to compare it to 
the actual actions on the ground. Obama‘s famous Cairo speech contains major signs of 
strengthening the relationship between the US and Arabs, which draws hints on Obama‘s 
policy as the new president. Moreover, Obama‘s speeches at the UN in 2009, 2011, 2013, 
2014, 2015 and 2016 present the changes in his policy over the course of his presidency, 
which help draw a line between the uttered words and the actual actions in light of the 
different political factors that lead the Obama administration to behave in a certain way at the 
UN. 
 In addition, speeches delivered by other prominent political figures will be studied 
as well for various reasons. Arafat‘s famous Gun and Olive Branch speech illustrates the 
Palestinian approach toward the conflict and the vision the PLO had to end the conflict. Also, 
 12 
 
Arafat‘s press conference statement in 1988 pinpoints the conditions that were set by the US 
in order to start a dialogue with the PLO. On another hand, two memos published by AIPAC 
discuss the necessity for bilateral negotiations instead of the steps the Palestinian leadership 
takes at the UN. Clear connection can be made between these memos and Obama‘s speeches 
and his constant advices to the Palestinians to return to the negotiations table instead of 
drafting UN resolutions critical of Israel. Moreover, analyzing some speeches by Netanyahu, 
Susan Rice and Samantha Power is essential toward figuring out a comprehensive picture of 
Obama‘s UN policy toward Palestine; by comparing the language in each speech. Kerry‘s 
last speech by the end of Obama‘s second term is important to discuss as well; for it provides 
clear explanations of Obama‘s second term policy toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as 
much as it provides hints on the reasons of the changes in Obama‘s policy compared to the 
policy he pursued during his first term.   
 
I. Abbreviations 
United Nations: UN 
General Assembly: GA 
Security Council: SC 
Palestine Liberation Organization: PLO 
The American Israel Political Affairs Committee: AIPAC 
The American Jewish Committee: AJC 
 
 
 
 
 
 13 
 
II. Basic Overview of the UN  
A. Brief Description of the UN, GA & SC 
 The United Nations (UN) is an international organization with 193 Member States 
working according to certain purposes and principles specified in the first chapter of the UN 
Charter. Since its establishment in 1945, the main purpose of the UN has been to ―maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace,‖ and also to ―develop friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples,‖ as well as achieving ―international co-operation in solving international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.‖ In order to serve these purposes, Member 
States shall act in accordance with specific principles. These principles include, inter alia, 
―the sovereign equality of all its Members,‖ the condition that ―all Members shall fulfill in 
good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter,‖ they 
also ―shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,‖ as well as giving ―the 
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter‖ 
(UN Charter, 1945).  
 The UN fulfills its mission through its main organs, which are: the General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council (which 
suspended operation in 1994), the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat, as well as 
its specialized programs such as the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP, UNRWA, and its 
specialized agencies: FAO, UNIDO, WHO, UNESCO, ILO and others (UN Website, 2018). 
As an international organization, the UN pursues its work through its Member States, by 
 14 
 
providing the secretarial and technical services for discussion and thus providing the space 
for governments to negotiate, plan some agreements and therefore solve problems together. 
The UN performs its functions through its organs and offices, which are spread in different 
regions; New York, where the headquarters is located, and other three offices in Geneva, 
Nairobi and Vienna (UN Website, 2018). 
 Ever since the creation of the UN, many geopolitical factors have affected its 
mechanism, the area of focus regarding international issues as well as the procedures by 
which resolutions pass. The world polarity changed, which had its impact on the UN; in 
terms of the ability of certain states to influence the decisions and priorities of other states. 
The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, which affected the balance of global powers and thus 
gave the US a margin to be more dominating. Abdelhamid Siyam, Former UN Spokesman, 
states-- in a private interview, that ―the UN went through three stages; the first stage is called 
the bipolar stage, which lasted from the establishment in 1945 until the end of the Cold War 
in 1991‖ (A. Siyam, personal communication, July 24, 2018). During that stage, the US and 
the Soviet Union were the two main hegemonic states in the world, and each one tried to use 
the UN for its own benefits. The second stage, however, is the unipolar, which started in 
1991 and had the US as the only dominant force. Siyam claims that in that stage ―the US was 
able to launch the war on Iraq and to impose sanctions on Libya.‖ However, this stage came 
to an end by the early 21
st
 century as new powers emerged , for example; the BRICS and the 
European Union, and other States such as China, India and Japan started showing their 
presence, leading to shape the third stage; the multipolar, which is the current stage of the UN 
life cycle. 
 The main organ of the UN is the General Assembly (GA), which is responsible for the 
policymaking and is represented by all 193 Member States. An annual GA regular session 
commences in September, at which important issues get discussed and a two-thirds majority 
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of the members present and voting is required for important decisions to pass, while decisions 
on less important questions are by simple majority. However, Special Sessions may be 
conducted if necessary, as it is mentioned in the fourth chapter of the UN Charter: ―the 
General Assembly shall meet in regular annual sessions and in such special sessions as 
occasion may require. Special sessions shall be convoked by the Secretary-General at the 
request of the Security Council or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations" (UN 
charter, 1945). In addition, an Emergency Special Session can be convened when the SC 
―fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression‖ (Resolution 377A(V), 1950), provided that this session shall be called if 
requested by the SC on the vote of any nine members or by a majority of the Members of the 
UN. 
 On the other hand, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security is given to the Security Council (SC). Decisions are made as a result of the 
votes of its 15 Members (5 Permanent and 10 non-Permanent members), and all UN Member 
States are obliged to comply with these decisions. According to Article 23 of the UN Charter, 
the five Permanent Members are the People‘s Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (Russia now), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
and the United States of America (UN charter, 1945), while the 10 non-Permanent Members 
are elected by the GA every two years, and ―when the two-year term of a non-Permanent 
Member concludes, it is not eligible to be immediately re-elected‖ (Gruenberg, 2009, p. 475). 
The elections to the SC occur by geographical region, and ―of the 10 rotating Members, three 
UN Member States represent Africa on the Council, two Member States represent the Asia-
Pacific, Latin American and Caribbean, and Western Europe and advanced industrialized 
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nations groupings, and one nation represents the Eastern European region‖ (Alexander & 
Rooney, 2017, p. 2). 
 In contrast to the GA, meetings of the SC are not fixed or limited, but the Charter 
requires a SC meeting at least every 14 days, as an answer to a ―request made by either a SC 
Member, the GA, the Secretary General, a circumstance dictated by the United Nations 
Charter or an initiative by the President of the Security Council‖ (Gruenberg, 2009, p. 476). 
While the GA elects the 10 non-Permanent of the SC members, it, however, does not 
interfere with SC decisions; even though during the formation of the UN Charter in 1945, 
proposals were presented to allow the GA to take role in that process, but they were ―judged 
to be too cumbersome and likely to inhibit decisive actions by the Security Council‖ (p. 476). 
Therefore, the idea of involving the GA in the SC proceedings was not accepted.  
 
B. Voting System at the UN: Basic Dynamics & Some Flaws 
 The voting system at the GA differs from that at the SC. As for the GA, Article 18 of 
the UN Charter states that ―each member of the General Assembly shall have one vote,‖ it 
also specifies that ―decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made 
by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.‖ Issues to be discussed at the 
GA vary and thus include—but are not limited to-- the election of the non-Permanent 
members of the SC, as well as the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership. 
However, ―decisions on other questions shall be made by a majority of the members present 
and voting,‖ provided that the GA votes on resolutions if requested by at least one State, and 
States can make four choices: ―favoring a norm- yes vote; opposing a norm- no vote; 
expressing neutrality or indifference- abstain vote; or remaining absent from voting 
altogether‖ (Brazys & Panke, 2017, p. 539). On the other hand, the SC pass resolutions that 
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support various actions including the use of force, and its voting system takes a different 
approach than the one at the GA; since the SC Members are categorized into Permanent and 
non-Permanent Members. Hence, the nature of the voting system at the SC, as it is mentioned 
in Chapter V, Article 27 of the UN Charter, revolves around the principle that each Member 
State of the 15 has one vote only and ―decisions of the Security Council on procedural 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, and decisions on all other 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes 
of the permanent members.‖ 
 SC resolutions should be accepted by all states. This seems vivid through analyzing 
the language used in SC resolutions; for example, the usage of phrases like ―decides‖ and 
―confirms its determination‖ makes the resolution more compelling with a strong binding 
force and a sense of compulsory adherence by all Member States. Therefore, draft resolutions 
go through many editing sessions until they evolve into a shape that is acceptable by Member 
States, and thus be ready to be submitted for a vote. This scenario may apply to GA 
resolutions as well, as Robert Keohane (1966) points out: ―most resolutions offered in the 
General Assembly go through a series of changes that are promoted through informal 
suggestion and, more rarely, through formal amendment‖ (p. 25). Therefore, the space for 
effective negotiation, which the UN fundamentally offers, may occur informally; in order to 
ensure that the final draft resolution to be voted on will be favorable to as many Member 
States as possible. This basically happens through opening a diplomacy path between States 
and offer them the chance to negotiate the language of the resolution. Thus, proposals 
submitted by States contain compromises in order to achieve a final draft text that is 
acceptable by the majority of States.  
 For instance, in 2018, Kuwait proposed a SC draft resolution; (S/2018/516), which 
called for the protection of the Palestinian civilians, following the mass killing of protesters at 
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the Gaza border on the 14
th
 of May 2018.  Siyam states that ―Kuwait negotiated so much, on 
every word, and they watered it down so much. The US wanted to include terrorism and 
Hamas by name. Kuwait said we are not talking about Hamas, we are talking about 
protection of the Palestinians‖ (A. Siyam, personal communication, July 24, 2018). Many 
States were involved in drafting the resolution, including European and African States, which 
proves that a space for negotiating the language of the draft resolution existed and thus the 
majority of the SC members voted in favor, to 1 against (United States), and 4 abstentions: 
Ethiopia, Netherlands, Poland and the United Kingdom (SC 8274
th
 Meeting, 2018).  
 However, such negotiations might generate a process that is not mentioned in the UN 
Charter; as the vote trading, which can be considered a flaw in the UN voting system. The 
fact that some issues are fundamentally very crucial to certain States leads those States to act 
according to their needs-- instead of working according to the UN principles-- and thus agree 
to exchange favors with other States through voting alongside the States that vote with them. 
This process might have negative consequences; such as creating a space for States to fulfill 
their needs through voting according to favors not to UN principles, which is a clear damage 
to the main UN purpose of creating a just and a better world. 
 In addition, mutual needs and priorities of specific States lead them to form some 
coalitions inside the UN, which lead to formulate decisions aimed at satisfying and benefiting 
these States and their allies. This means that States with mutual interests, sources of power, 
purposes and/or needs may collaborate aiming to pass or block certain resolutions. Such a 
coalition can be a double-edged sword for it either makes it easier for certain States to stand 
with just causes; such as the Group of 77 and China, which is a coalition of developing 
nations aimed at promoting the collective economic interests of its Member States through 
enhancing the negotiating capacity in the UN (G-77 Website, 2018), or it might result in UN 
intervention with international issues in a way that contradicts the affirmed UN mission of 
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creating justice in the world. For example, the alliance between the US and its neighbor 
country Canada against resolutions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can be considered a 
representation of the second form of these coalitions, which fundamentally stands against the 
UN principles.  
 Also, the UN voting system may be flawed since temporary members of the SC 
receive a better treatment from the IMF or the World Bank in exchange for their political 
support for permanent members; such as the US (Hwang, Sanford and Lee, 2015). This 
assumption contradicts what the UN Charter calls for in Article 2: ―the organization is based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,‖ since it does not help achieve 
equality for all States, nor it allows States to act neutrally; for Member States that benefit 
from the IMF or the World Bank might be influenced to behave similarly with permanent 
States, rather than standing for the UN principles and the international law. In addition, 
Member States might be distracted by the process of attracting more financial aid and forget 
about the main purpose of their existence at the SC, which is helping find solutions to 
international conflicts and thus creating a better world, which will result in creating a serious 
flaw in the work of the UN and an atmosphere of corruption in the organization. Therefore, 
one can observe that a clear contradiction occasionally lies between the UN stated mission 
and the real actions of some of its Members. 
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C. The American Approach at the UN: Practical Context  
 The previously-explained structure and functions of both the GA and the SC raise 
some questions regarding the dominating States at the UN and the nature of their power. 
First, the fact that the GA is represented through all 193 Member States leads to question the 
influence of each of these States on the decision-making process, especially that ―the arena of 
international politics in which the GA exists is militarily dominated by a small number of 
powerful nations‖ (Keohane, 1966, p. 5). Thus, Member States with exceptional powers, as 
the US, may try to dominate the decision-making process at the GA. This claim can be 
further explained through studying the influence of the American aid to specific States, which 
lead these States to ally with the US and agree upon the American goals. On this regard, 
Siyam assures the previously-stated assumptions and thus explains that ―applying pressure on 
smaller States is a very common practice at the United Nations by the big powers, who try to 
lure smaller States to their side‖ (A. Siyam, personal communication, July 24, 2018). This 
pressure takes different forms as it might be imposed financially, politically, or even 
militarily, and ―threats of retaliation of one sort or another usually need not be made explicit. 
Often it is sufficient that the smaller state is aware that big brother is watching‖ (Keohance, 
1966, p. 19). 
 However, the US cannot buy the support of all GA Member States on each and every 
decision, taking into consideration that the UN is currently in the multipolar stage, where 
many developing countries were able to join the GA as Member States. These countries face 
many similar struggles, which they aim to find common solutions for. They thus choose to 
ally with each other toward enhancement of their countries, leading to reduce the influence of 
the US in the GA; since they are united on one front. Furthermore, some States follow 
moderate political stances in the GA; therefore, their role is crucial toward preventing 
powerful Member States from dominating the GA. The fact that new States were able to gain 
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membership made it more difficult for the US to satisfy all regional groups at once; African, 
Asia-Pacific, Eastern-European, Western- European, Latin American and Caribbean. These 
groups may not have mutual interests with the US at all times, thus the US cannot buy their 
votes as easy as it used to when the UN was first established, especially when it comes to 
issues that some countries of these groups stand fully against; such as Venezuela‘s and South 
Africa‘s position toward the Israeli occupation of Palestine.  
 As a result of the changes that occurred during the multipolar stage, the US 
dominance at the GA became less strong than it used to be in previous stages, which basically 
led the US to focus their efforts in the SC. This UN organ ―shall determine the existence of 
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken,‖ (UN Charter, Article 39, 1945) it 
is thus permitted to take crucial security decisions, which accordingly qualify the 15 SC 
Members to have control over the world‘s peace and security, especially the 5 Permanent 
Members with their right to ―Veto‖. The latter is the most significant distinction between 
Permanent and non-Permanent Members in the UN Charter, and it basically means that a 
draft SC resolution shall be disapproved, if faced with at least one veto by any of the 5 
Permanent Members (Security Council Report Website, 2015).  
 Since the US is a Permanent SC Member, it accordingly has the freedom to veto any 
SC draft resolution that is not compatible with its national and/or foreign interests, or if it 
imposes a threat on any of its allies; such as Israel, leading to meet the interests of specific 
States rather than achieving the desired purpose of the SC, which is international peace and 
security. Taking this assumption into consideration, the first hypothesis of this thesis is: if a 
SC draft resolution is lawful but against the interests of the US or its allies, an American veto 
will be the reaction thereto. For instance, SC draft resolution (S/2017/1060) was tabled at the 
SC by Egypt on the status of Jerusalem and thus reaffirmed that ―any decisions and actions 
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that purport to have altered the status of Jerusalem have no legal effect, are null and void and 
must be rescinded,‖ and it was supported by 14 SC members, yet the US chose to shield its 
main ally, Israel, and present its veto, preventing it from being adopted. In fact, along through 
the years, the US has proved to veto many SC draft resolutions on Palestine, even when some 
of these resolutions were supported by the majority of the SC Members. This constant 
vetoing stands as an evidence that the US supported its main ally; Israel, at the UN regardless 
if all other 14 Member States supported the draft resolution on Palestine or not. According to 
the Security Council Veto Report, the US used its veto at the SC 84 times during the 1970-
2017 period; 43 vetoes were against draft resolutions related to Israel, and 29 of them were 
against draft resolutions on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
 However, in such incidents, the veto can be challenged at a GA Emergency Special 
Session, if the session was requested by the SC on the vote of any seven, now nine, members 
or by a majority of the Members of the UN, as it is mentioned in Resolution 377A(V); 
adopted in 1950 and entitled: Uniting for Peace. Ever since the adoption of this resolution, 
ten emergency special sessions were conducted, the last of them was on Palestine. Larry 
Johnson (2014) states that ―the tenth emergency special session on Palestine began in 1997 
and technically can still be resumed.‖ Therefore, Palestinians have a chance of overriding an 
American veto, since the 10
th
 emergency session is still open. In fact, ―Palestinians have 
utilized this resolution very well on issues related to security and protection; such as the 
Israeli Separation Wall, but not on all issues‖ Siyam states (A. Siyam, personal 
communication, July 24, 2018). 
 In addition, the US may also tend to use its influence in the SC and pressure some 
Members not to vote for a SC draft resolution; in order to make sure it does not get the 
needed nine affirmative votes, and thus the US will not need to present its veto. For instance, 
in 2014, a SC draft resolution (S/2014/916) was submitted for a vote and it aimed at setting a 
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deadline to establish a sovereign Palestinian State. However, the draft resolution failed to 
receive the nine votes that are needed for it to be tabled in the 15-member body. Siyam 
explains how the US pressured Nigeria not to vote for the draft resolution so it will not gain 
the 9 affirmative votes and thus the US will be spared the use of its veto, which indeed 
happened (A. Siyam, personal communication, July 24, 2018). John Kerry, the US Secretary 
of State at that time, reached out to many senior foreign officials, including the president of 
Nigeria, to have them stand against the resolution, and he ―worked to line up enough 
abstentions from American allies like South Korea and Rwanda so that the United States 
would not have to wield its veto‖ (Gordon & Sengupta, 2014). This incident proves the 
second hypothesis that the US does influence the attitude of other States at the SC. 
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III. The US and Palestine in the UN: A Diplomatic Battle Field 
A. Prior to Obama: Historical Milestones at the UN 
 The history of the American intervention in the Question of Palestine goes back to 
1947, before the creation of Israel in 1948, when the US voted in favor of the partition plan 
for the land of Palestine. The partition plan, which can be considered as the beginning of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, took place at the GA, and the US made its decision to support 
―the November 29, 1947 passage of UNGA resolution 181 on the Future Government of 
Palestine, which gave birth to Israel‖ (Sarsar, 2004, p. 462). Consequently, in the year after, 
Israel was established on the 15
th
 of May 1948, and the US was the first country to recognize 
it. This American recognition of Israel was the very first step toward the construction of a 
strong bond between the two nations, which was strengthened further along through the 
years.  
 Another milestone in the US-Palestine relationship at the UN took place in 1974, 
when the President of the GA, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, invited Yasser Arafat, the former 
Chairman of the PLO, to deliver a speech at the GA in New York. Arafat‘s famous ―Gun and 
Olive Branch‖ speech, delivered on the 13th of November 1974, was hopeful of the 
establishment of one democratic state for Muslims, Jews and Christians, all together on one 
land; as he spoke: ―let us work together that my dream may be fulfilled, that I may return 
with my people out of exile, there in Palestine to live with this Jewish freedom-fighter and his 
partners, with this Arab priest and his brothers, in one democratic State where Christian, Jew 
and Muslim live in justice, equality and fraternity‖ (Arafat, 1974). These words of Arafat 
were basically a reflection of the PLO Charter and the vision that Palestinians had in 1974 of 
a one state for all.  
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Nabil Shaath, Advisor to President Mahmoud Abbas on Foreign Affairs and 
International Relations, comments on this event, during a private interview:  
There was not much support for this step among the Palestinians. There was still a lot 
of discussion whether to do that or not. Also, the United Nations did not have, at that 
time, a good reputation among Palestinians. The UN adopted only two resolutions 
that should have been helpful to the Palestinians; the partition resolution (181) and the 
return of refugees resolution (194), but they were not implemented. Maybe because 
the US was the major power at that time. So the United Nations became the 
organization that accepted what Israel did, and the best it did against it is to give 
money to the refugees. For many Palestinians, the UN was nothing but UNRWA. (N. 
Shaath, personal communication, July 29, 2018) 
Yet, Arafat considered this opportunity the best thing to do at that stage of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict, despite the fact that the US was not fully in support of the invitation. Arafat‘s 
decision to address the UN must have been a reaction to his desire to attract the international 
support and help solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, especially that 27 years had passed 
since the UN partition plan of 1947, and no real implementation occurred, nor a Palestinian 
State was created as it was planned thereon. Therefore, Arafat must have felt that it is thus the 
responsibility of the UN to interfere again and help solve the conflict, as it did interfere 
before in 1947. 
 For the US, Arafat‘s speech at the GA did not include the language required by the 
them; and it contradicted their goal of securing an independent Israeli State; ―Secretary 
Kissinger was not charmed by Arafat‘s overtures, nor was he pleased with the PLO‘s new 
diplomatic position‖ (Chamberlin , 2015, p. 250), indicating that Arafat‘s appearance at the 
GA did not get in line with the American discourse of protecting the sovereignty of the State 
of Israel, and it further escalated the gap between the Palestinian and American leaderships, 
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leading Kissinger to conclude that ―a solution to the West Bank problem was unachievable 
short of change in PLO attitude or the reappearance of the Jordan-option.‖ This attitude of the 
US proves their crystal-clear support for an Israeli State, while intending to stand against the 
establishment of the State of Palestine, especially that Kissinger declared after Arafat‘s 
speech that ―this assembly is no longer an international body; it‘s a forum for an anti-Western 
sentiment.‖  
 Furthermore, on the 22
nd
 of November 1974, the GA adopted resolutions 3236 and 
3237, despite the US vote against them. The resolutions reaffirmed ―the inalienable rights of 
the Palestinian people in Palestine and emphasized that their realization was indispensable for 
the solution of the question of Palestine‖ and gave the Palestine Liberation Organization 
―PLO‖ observer status at the UN. These resolutions practically made the PLO an 
internationally accepted organization representing the Palestinian people, which opened the 
door for the PLO to reach out to other international organizations and seek a similar status. In 
fact, the adoption of these resolutions provides hints on Arafat‘s desire to attend the GA and 
address it. It seems that Arafat must have had a clue that these resolutions will be adopted, 
and the observer status is thus guaranteed, which made him take the effort to travel and 
deliver a speech, despite the Palestinian people‘s decreased trust in the UN.  
 As a result of these resolutions, the relationship between the US and Palestine was 
aggravated much further; and the conflict escalated after Arafat declared the establishment 
and independence of the State of Palestine in Algeria on the 15
th
 of November 1988. In that 
year, the US-- under Reagan‘s presidency, refused to grant Arafat a visa to enter the US, and 
thereby prevented him from attending the General Assembly Session. This behavior of the 
US proves how hostile it was toward Palestinians, even when it comes to the multilateral 
arena not only the bilateral. Consequently, the GA had to vote, on the 2
nd
 of December 1988, 
to move its session from New York to Geneva; in order to ensure Arafat‘s presence and 
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ability to deliver his speech. In spite of the US vote against this resolution, it overwhelmingly 
passed, and the session was held in Geneva that month. 
 In the meantime, between the period 3
rd
 -13
th
 December 1988, indirect secret talks 
were held between the PLO and the US through Sweden. Jim Anderson (1990) states that 
―Swedish Foreign Minister Sven Anderson approached Secretary of State George Shultz with 
a proposal that Sweden be used as an intermediary to set up a direct series of meetings 
between the U.S. government and the PLO‖. This initiative first began in the summer of 1988 
but accelerated after Shultz denied Arafat‘s visa to the US. Anderson adds that ―Shultz called 
in the Swedish Ambassador on the 3
rd
 of December1988, with a secret letter to the Swedish 
Foreign Minister in Stockholm, giving Yasser Arafat the exact formulation to use in meeting 
the U.S. conditions about renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel's right to exist.‖  
 Thus, the PLO responded on the 7
th
 of December 1988 with a secret letter, through 
the Swedish Foreign Minister, that ―it would follow the Shultz formulation but also 
persuaded Shultz to drop language that would call for an end to all forms of violence once the 
negotiations began, since the PLO convinced Shultz that it was incapable of stopping the 
intifada or uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories‖ (Anderson, 1990). Consequently, 
Arafat delivered his speech in Geneva on the 13
th
 of December 1988, but the US considered 
it vague; since it did not fulfill the three conditions set by them. Therefore, on the following 
day; 14
th
 of December 1988, a press conference was held, where Arafat declared his 
acceptance of the three conditions set by the US. These conditions included recognition of 
Israel's right to exist, acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338, and renunciation of terrorism, 
as Arafat spoke: 
In my speech yesterday, it was clear that we mean our people's right to freedom and 
national independence according to Resolution 181 and the right of all parties concerned 
in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and as I have mentioned 
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including the state of Palestine and Israel and other neighbors according to the 
Resolutions 242 and 338. As for terrorism, I announced it yesterday in no uncertain 
terms, and yet, I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of 
terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism (Arafat, 1988). 
Arafat‘s acceptance to precisely utter the American conditions must have happened because 
he knew that the USSR is coming to an end soon and the US will be the only dominant force 
for a while. Thus, Arafat‘s political calculations must have been focused on opening a 
dialogue with the US since the USSR, a big supporter of the PLO back then, is going to 
collapse soon and the American support will be very much needed. 
 Consequently, after having the 3 conditions set by the US fulfilled, the US-PLO 
dialogue was opened, and on the following day, the GA adopted resolution 43/177, which 
"acknowledges the proclamation of the State of Palestine by the Palestine National 
Council on 15 November 1988" and "decides that, effective as of 15 December 1988, the 
designation 'Palestine' should be used in place of the designation 'Palestine Liberation 
Organization' in the United Nations system." Despite the US decision to open a substantive 
dialogue with the PLO one day before this resolution was adopted, they yet chose to vote 
against it along with their main ally in the Middle East region; Israel.  
 Regarding Israeli settlements, the US has frequently showed an unshakable 
commitment toward protecting them at the UN throughout the years. For instance, in 1997, 
the SC failed to adopt two draft resolutions on Israeli settlements; due to the American veto. 
The first draft resolution S/1997/199 was submitted into vote on the 7
th
 of March 1997, and 
the second draft resolution S/1997/241 on the 21
st
 (UNISPAL, 1997). Both draft resolutions 
called on Israel to refrain from East Jerusalem settlement activity, and even though the 
resolutions were supported by the other 14 members-- except for the abstention of Costa Rica 
at the voting for the second draft resolution, the US chose to provide a negative vote and 
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justify their decision by claiming that ―neither the Council not the Assembly should be 
inserting themselves into issues that the negotiating partners have decided will be addressed 
in their permanent status talks‖ (UN Website, 1997).  
 However, the American position toward Israeli settlements has not always been in 
favor of Israel. In fact, finding a final solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been 
crucial toward the fulfilment of few important American national interests. Thus, a successful 
peace settlement of the conflict has been desired by many American presidents, because as 
long as the conflict continues, obstacles will keep generating and therefore it will be difficult 
to manage the American objectives in the region; such as the access to the Arab energy 
reserves. Based on that fact, Jimmy Carter, for instance, was one of the American presidents 
who acknowledged the importance of solving the conflict and acted accordingly. Under his 
administration, two SC resolutions on the issue of Israeli settlements were adopted; resolution 
446, adopted on the 22
nd
 of March 1979 with the abstention of the US, and resolution 465, 
adopted on the 1
st
 of March 1980, with 15 total positive votes (UNISPAL, 1980).  
 These two resolutions were an exception in the well-known American attitude at the 
UN when it comes to resolutions on Palestine, due to the fact that they took place during 
Carter‘s Administration. In fact, Carter was very knowledgeable about the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict and spoke ―more forcefully about the need and justice of a Palestinian state than any 
other past US president‖ (Terry, 2017, p. 896). However, it was not always easy to support 
Palestine; since the American domestic system and politics stand as an obstacle. With the 
American elections system offering the president a term of 4 years, sensitive issues like the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict have to be carefully tackled, especially when a president plans to 
win another presidential term. And since the Jewish lobby in the US is very strong and has 
the power to affect the American political agenda and the choices set by the presidents, 
declaring the American support for Israel gets on top of the agenda for the majority of 
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presidential campaigns, in order to secure the domestic political support. Hence, Carter‘s 
historical attitude in the previously-mentioned resolutions confirms the third hypothesis that 
the political context affects the American attitude at the UN, and also plays a major role in 
determining the nature of the American-Palestinian relationship at the UN.  
 
B. Theories of International Relations: Obama’s Discourse 
 According to US Diplomacy Website, Realism, as one main theory of international 
relations, ―treats states as the primary unit of analysis. Power is primarily viewed in military 
terms, and the military power of other states presents the greatest potential danger to an 
individual state . . . Realists have also long rejected notions such as that free trade or 
scientific progress might lead to long-term peace, viewing such ideas as dangerous chimera.‖ 
On the other hand, Liberalism means ―a perspective on international politics which views the 
state as the unit of analysis, but also includes international law, international organizations 
and nongovernmental organizations as increasingly important factors in world politics.‖  
 The American foreign policy toward Palestine has always been a reflection of the 
different political and strategic factors, which influence the American president‘s attitude 
toward Palestine. The different geopolitical aspects in the region, as well as the American 
interests in it have directed President Barack Obama to form certain foreign strategies, which 
basically aim at containing the American global dominance. Hence, the Obama 
Administration was following more than one theory of the international relations theories, 
depending on the goals and purposes it wanted to accomplish, as well as the kind of pressure 
created by the Jewish American lobbying groups and the conservative officials in the 
government, described by Payton Knopf, former Spokesman at the US Mission to the UN 
under then-Ambassador Susan E. Rice, in a private interview, as: ―domestic politics always 
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have an influence on the foreign policy; particularly policies at the presidential level, and that 
represents the democracy in our country‖ (P. Knopf, personal communication, August 8, 
2018). 
 Thus, the Liberalism dimensions seem vividly obvious through Obama‘s speeches as 
well as his actions, but also a Realist approach was followed by Obama, at some specific 
occasions. Hence, Obama‘s international policy did not depend on only one theory of 
international relations, but rather following the suitable approach whenever it seemed 
appropriate. This claim is supported by Obama‘s Nobel Peace Prize speech, as he said: 
There will be times when nations – acting individually or in concert – will find the 
use of force not only necessary but morally justified. I make this statement mindful of 
what Martin Luther King Jr. said in this same ceremony years ago: ―Violence never 
brings permanent peace. It solves no social problem: it merely creates new and more 
complicated ones.‖ As someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. 
King‘s life work, I am a living testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know 
there‘s nothing weak – nothing passive – nothing naïve – in the creed and lives of 
Gandhi and King. But as a head of state sworn to protect and defend my nation, I 
cannot be guided by their examples alone. I face the world as it is, and cannot stand 
idle in the face of threats to the American people . . . To say that force may sometimes 
be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections 
of man and the limits of reason. (Obama, 2009) 
In other words, not only did Obama show an understanding of the consequences of violent 
conflicts-- if the Liberal approach was not followed, but also declared his willingness to 
follow the Realist approach when it is necessary, stressing the fact that the theory to be 
followed is the one which brings the US the ultimate deal of security.  
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 Moreover, Obama‘s Cairo speech, delivered on June 4, 2009, assures the above-
mentioned assumption and further represents how his policy has both realist and liberal 
dimensions. When Obama spoke about the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Obama aimed at 
emphasizing the American firm support to Israel as a strong ally in the Middle East region; 
he thus stated: ―America's strong bonds with Israel are well known. This bond is unbreakable. 
It is based upon cultural and historical ties, and the recognition that the aspiration for a 
Jewish homeland is rooted in a tragic history that cannot be denied.‖ This statement confirms 
Obama‘s realist approach and his deep understanding that securing the safety and sovereignty 
of Israel is essential for the US; for it protects the American dominance in that region of the 
world.  
 On the other hand, Obama‘s Cairo speech contained liberal notions as well, when he 
spoke in powerful terms of Palestinians and expressed adherence to the human rights law, 
which the Liberalism stands for. He thus stated:  
It is also undeniable that the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered 
in pursuit of a homeland. For more than sixty years they have endured the pain of 
dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring lands 
for a life of peace and security that they have never been able to lead. They endure the 
daily humiliations – large and small – that come with occupation. So let there be no 
doubt: the situation for the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will not turn our 
backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their 
own. 
 Prifti (2017) also assures the claim that Obama followed more than one international 
relations theory and states that ―Obama believed that one doctrine could not be applied to all 
states and regions around the world‖ (p. 118). However, Stephen Walt (2016) has a different 
perspective and thus argues that Obama‘s foreign policy did not follow the main principles of 
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political realism. Walt (2016) alludes to the fact that Obama‘s participation in the failed 
Middle East peace process between Israel and Palestine stands as an example of violating the 
realist doctrine, as he says: 
 Similarly, Obama‘s well-intentioned efforts to achieve peace between Israelis and 
 Palestinians were a series of humiliations: Israeli settlements kept expanding, Gaza 
 kept getting pummeled, moderate Palestinians were discredited, Hamas grew 
 stronger, and the two-state solution that Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama all 
 favored is now dead (if not quite buried). 
 Furthermore, Obama‘s international policy matches the above-mentioned definition of 
Liberalism in many ways; as it views international relations ―as a system of interactions 
holding the potential for mutual gain‖ (US Diplomacy Website).  This claim seems clear in 
Obama‘s speech at the GA on the 28th of September 2015, as he said: 
 Over seven decades, terrible conflicts have claimed untold victims.  But we have 
 pressed forward, slowly, steadily, to make a  system of international rules and norms 
 that are better and stronger and more consistent. It is this international order that has 
 underwritten unparalleled advances in human liberty and prosperity.  It is this 
 collective endeavor that‘s brought about diplomatic cooperation between the world‘s 
 major powers, and buttressed a global economy that has lifted more than a billion 
 people  from poverty. (Obama, 2015) 
According to Erik Voeten (2015), ―Obama portrays the U.N. as a centerpiece to a liberal 
international order that espouses respect for international law, human rights, and democracy,‖ 
confirming the previous definition of Liberalism, which views international relations as a 
way to work multilaterally toward universal prosperity.   
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IV.  Obama and Palestine in the UN (First Presidential Term) 
 During his first term, Obama‘s foreign policy aimed at maintaining the status quo and 
the American hegemony in the world, as well as preventing the emergence of a regional 
hegemon, and his UN policy was focused on expanding notions of engagement, cooperation 
and common global action (Anderson, 2012). However, the engagement at the UN, which 
Obama pursued, took a contradictory path; since his actual intervention in the UN aimed at 
standing against specific countries; like Iran and Libya, while supporting its allies like Israel, 
despite Israel‘s ongoing violations of a series of SC resolutions. Obama came into office with 
the promise of transforming US foreign policy, and ―he promised peace instead of war, 
cooperation instead of conflict, prosperity instead of poverty, equality instead of disparity, 
and hope instead of pessimism‖ (Prifti, 2017, p. 146). On the contrary, Obama‘s 
achievements had few of those promises happen, since reality was harsher than he expected. 
The pressure on Obama by the American pro-Israel lobbying groups as well as the domestic 
policies that support Israel must have forced him to take Israel‘s side, especially after the 
failure of the Democratic party at the midterm elections in 2010, because according to the 
2010-elections results, the Republicans took control over the House of Representatives and 
won 5 more seats at the Senate. Thus, Obama must have been blamed for this loss and he was 
also ―in a way accused, maybe wrongly, that he is too soft on the issue of supporting Israel, 
especially after his famous 2009 speech in Cairo‖ (A. Siyam, personal communication, July 
24, 2018). Therefore, one could assume that the pressure impacted Obama to strengthen his 
support to Israel in order to regain the trust of the pro-Israel Americans in the first place, and 
his Democratic party in the second.  
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A. Draft Resolution (S/2011/24) on Israeli Settlements  
 The peace and prosperity, which Obama promised, were not fully achieved when it 
comes to discussing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. While Obama has declared, in his speech 
at the GA on September 23, 2009, that the US ―does not accept the legitimacy of continued 
Israeli settlements‖ (Obama, 2009), he yet supported them at the UN and vetoed the draft 
resolution (S/2011/24), which supported the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, condemned 
Israeli settlement activities and called for a freeze on further settlement construction. 
Obama‘s Administration chose to veto it, while all fourteen of the other members of the SC 
voted in favor (UNISPAL website, 2011). This attitude proves the first hypothesis: if a SC 
draft resolution is lawful but against the interests of the US or its allies, an American veto 
will be the reaction thereto. And even though the US explained their veto by claiming that 
such resolutions do not help the negotiation process between the two parties, their position 
still seems paradoxical to their stated international policy of engagement and global 
cooperation, which undermines the role of the US as a mediator in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict.   
 In addition, the US Ambassador to the UN at that time, Susan Rice, justified in her 
speech at the UN, on 18 February 2011, the American veto of the anti-settlement resolution 
by saying: 
 While we agree with our fellow Council members-- and indeed with the wider world, 
 about the folly and illegitimacy of continued Israeli settlement activity, we think it 
 unwise for this Council to attempt to resolve the core issues that divide Israelis and 
 Palestinians. We, therefore, regrettably, have opposed this draft resolution. 
However, the draft resolution did not really "attempt to resolve the core issues that divide 
Israelis and Palestinians" (Rice, 2011). Instead, it explicitly reiterated the demand ―that Israel, 
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the occupying power, immediately and completely ceases all settlement activities in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory‖ and to continue the negotiations on the final issues in the 
Middle East peace process (Draft Resolution S/2011/24).  
 Furthermore, Payton Knopf, former Spokesman at the US Mission to the UN under 
then-Ambassador Susan E. Rice comments- in a private interview, on this incident: "when 
you are a policy maker, you have to weigh the practical impact of any action you are taking. 
So I think when you look at this resolution, one of the questions you have to consider is 
whether it actually made a practical difference in terms of either the construction of 
settlements or creating an environment that is going to be more conclusive to a negotiated 
settlement based on the two-state solution‖ (P. Knopf, personal communication, August 8, 
2018). However, the fact that the draft resolution insisted that negotiations be based on 
international law is what the Obama Administration rejected (Zunes, 2012, p. 12), despite the 
fact that it is actually a very appropriate role for the SC.  
 In fact, Obama‘s attitude clearly aimed at protecting Israel, even if the latter is 
violating the international law and basic legal principals. This is simply because Israel is a 
strong ally of the US in the Middle East region, and according to Shaath ―it was a question of 
calculation of how he can continue to rule the US. That was his defining moment, and we, 
Palestinians, had to pay the price‖ (N. Shaath, personal communication, July 29, 2018), 
which assures the forth hypothesis that Obama‘s stated policy regarding solving the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is contradicted by his administration‘s actions on the ground, since 
the US have continuously opposed the Israeli settlement activities yet did not help stop this 
settlement expansion through its interference at the UN 
 From a Palestinian perspective, Feda Abdelhady, Deputy Permanent Observer 
Mission of Palestine to the United Nations, explains, in a private interview, that this draft 
resolution ―was negotiated over the course of almost two months, and the negotiations and 
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discussions were also held with the Obama Administration including with Susan Rice‖ (F, 
Abdelhady, personal communication, July 31, 2018). She also explained how Palestinians 
were very close to reaching an agreement that would ensure US support for the draft 
resolution, but ―there was intense lobbying by the Israeli government-- Netanyahu in 
particular and the Congress.‖ Therefore, one can argue that Obama‘s approach was indeed 
influence by the Israeli government through its Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu; 
especially that in Netanyahu‘s speech at the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee 
(AIPAC) Conference on 22 March 2010, he declared an idea that ―the United States can help 
the parties resolve their problems, but it cannot solve the problems for the parties. Peace 
cannot be imposed from the outside. It can only come through direct negotiations in which 
we develop mutual trust.‖ Five months later, the same idea was presented in Obama‘s 
remarks after bilateral meetings with Mideast leaders on the 1
st
 of September, as he stated: 
The United States will put our full weight behind this effort . . . But let me be  very clear.  
Ultimately the United States cannot impose a solution, and we cannot want it more than 
the parties themselves. There are enormous risks involved here for all the parties 
concerned, but we cannot do it for them. We can create the environment and the 
atmosphere for negotiations, but ultimately, it‘s going to require the leadership on both 
the Palestinian and the Israeli sides. 
This statement of Obama has paradoxical interpretations; it can either be viewed as a positive 
indication that the US stands with a just solution and will help secure it with all possible 
means, and it also reflects how Obama‘s words were a clear imitation to Netanyahu‘s, which 
were uttered five months before. Therefore, one could assume that Obama spoke in a tone 
that was initially generated based on the needs of Israel, whose one main aim is preventing 
any international intervention in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
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 In fact, the overall political context of the Middle East during the period, when draft 
resolution (S/2011/24) was vetoed by the US, was less stable than before, especially after the 
Arab Spring and the tension it caused in the region. Therefore; these increasing tensions in 
the region led to shift the American focus from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the other 
arising problems in the wider region, and a considerable American attention was given to 
issues related to the revolutionary incidents in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and other Arab states, 
with less attention to the conflict. In addition, the US must have thought that if this draft 
resolution pass, the conflict might be further escalated, and violent consequences might be 
expected, as Abdelhady puts it: ―the US did not want to do anything that would further raise 
tensions and instability in the Middle East.‖.  
 
B. Palestine’s Application for UN Membership in 2011 
 The previously-mentioned American veto to draft resolution (S/2011/24) assures the 
fact that Obama‘s administration had frequently taken a clear anti-Palestine position, which 
was also reflected when the first Obama administration blocked Palestinian membership in 
the UN in 2011, when President Mahmoud Abbas submitted an application to the SC for full 
UN membership on September 23, 2011. At that time, Palestine had an observer status at the 
UN, and thus the Palestinians sought an upgrade to Palestine‘s status to be a full member-
state, which ―includes formal recognition of a Palestinian state by the most authoritative 
organ of the world body, and it enshrines two additional key principles: (1) that the pre-1967 
armistice line should be the basis for future negotiations over borders, and (2) that eastern 
Jerusalem be the capital of this Palestinian state‖ (Rosen, 2011). 
 While some may believe that it was the right decision to do yet it came a little late, 
Abbas must have previously hoped that Israel will fulfill its duties based on the previous 
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agreements and help implement the two-state solution, and he must have been very positive 
regarding the negotiation process. However, with the continued Israeli settlement expansion 
and violations of the international law and the human rights law, Israel made the negotiations 
seem pointless; for no concrete results were accomplished. Therefore, Abbas felt it was the 
right time to take a step in another direction despite the American and the Israeli disapproval. 
 The Obama Administration was focused on stopping this step from going forward. 
They thus tried to persuade Abbas to cancel the UN bid; Denise Ross and David Hale ―met 
with Abbas in a final unsuccessful attempt to pressure him to back down‖ (Hammond, 2016, 
p. 353), Obama did too the day before Abbas addressed the GA and tried to convince him one 
last time not to submit an UN application for statehood. In addition, the American Congress 
tried to pressure Abbas to drop the bid by pushing for a substantial cut in the US aid to the 
Palestinians, as a punishment for the UN bid in the first place, as well as a threat to cancel it 
(p. 358). 
 In fact, one can argue that some of these American efforts to stop the UN bid occurred 
as a result of the influence of American pro-Israel lobbying groups. For instance, David 
Harris, the Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee (AJC), explained his 
opinion regarding the negative consequences of the Palestinian UN bid, aiming to warn the 
Palestinian leadership not to pursue it further. He thus stated that the UN bid -if succeeded- 
will affect the Palestinians negatively, as ―they grasp that annual US aid of about $500 
million may come to a screeching halt‖ (Harris, 2011). This might explain why the American 
Congress indeed pushed for a substantial cut in the US aid to the Palestinians, and thus prove 
the inevitable influence of the American pro-Israel lobbying groups on the American 
government. Moreover, in a memo, published by the AIPAC six months prior to this UN bid, 
a tough and direct order was placed that ―the United States must continue to publicly make 
clear that it opposes unilateral Palestinian steps and that it will act against any effort at the 
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U.N. that seeks to single out Israel‖ (AIPAC, 2011). This public announcement can be 
considered a clear threat to Palestine as well as an alert to the Obama administration, 
indicating that the US has a firm responsibility to stick to support Israel against any UN 
intervention critical of it.  
 Nonetheless, Abbas was determined on pursuing this goal and submitting the UN bid, 
no matter if the US or Israel stands against it or not. This was quite a rare incident; since 
Abbas has always tried to find solutions with the help of the US, but the escalation of Israeli 
violations and the American passive position toward it drove him to sort the problem out in a 
new diplomatic way through the UN, which gained him a lot of support from the Palestinians, 
who as well were fed up with the unavailing American promises. Not only did the US try to 
convince Abbas to back down the UN bid, but also reached out to other States to convince 
them not to vote for the application, so it will not gain the nine votes needed for it to be 
tabled. Many European countries were convinced by the US including Germany, France and 
Spain.  
 Consequently, the nine votes were not accomplished, and the application was not put 
for a vote. Siyam states: ―the country that could make it was Bosnia. Abbas went there and 
talked to their president, but they explained that they cannot vote‖ (A. Siyam, personal 
communication, July 24, 2018), and their decision is basically a result of the American 
pressure. On this matter, Abdelhady claims: ―there was Israeli threats not only American, and 
for a country like Bosnia, seeking to become a member of the European Union and to expand 
its trade, they were looking at their national interests like every other country. Thus, they 
could not take a position regarding the application‖ (F, Abdelhady, personal communication, 
July 31, 2018).  
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 The Obama Administration‘s refusal to support the application is a vivid example of 
their true intention to ignore the legal right for Palestinians to seek recognition at an 
international organization. Therefore, even though Obama‘s policy was focused on 
engagement and multilateralism to help create peace and resolve conflicts, but when it comes 
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Obama would suggest that both parties shall work on 
finding a solution without any international intervention, as he stated in his speech at the UN 
on 21 September 2011: ―ultimately, it is the Israelis and the Palestinians--not us--who must 
reach agreement on the issues that divide them: on borders and on security, on refugees and 
Jerusalem" (Obama, 2011). This statement clearly shows how double-standard the attitude of 
the Obama Administration used to be during that period. It is also a proof that Obama‘s 
decision was influenced by the American pro-Israel lobbying groups, which were determined 
on preventing any UN intervention in the conflict, as mentioned in an AIPAC memo, 
published on December 21, 2010, stating that ―a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state 
would not solve any of the difficult issues at the heart of the dispute: borders, refugees, 
Jerusalem, security arrangements and water.‖  
 With regards to this application, Abdelhady claims that ―there was a fleeting hope that 
somehow the US will not veto the recommendation to be submitted to the Security Council, 
but we also knew in the months prior that it is going to be very difficult.‖ She also adds that 
―it seemed a remote possibility that the Obama Administration would agree to this, but the 
Palestinian leadership felt that this was an important conversation that had to be held‖ (F, 
Abdelhady, personal communication, July 31, 2018). Therefore, a special  focus was given to 
the application‘s language, which precisely declared the following words: ―it is being 
submitted based on the Palestinian people's natural, legal and historic rights and based on 
United Nations General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 as well as the 
Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine of 15 November 1988 and the 
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acknowledgement by the General Assembly of this Declaration in resolution 43/177 of 15 
December 1988,‖ as well as a declaration that ―the State of Palestine is a peace-loving nation 
and that it accepts the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations and 
solemnly undertakes to fulfill them‖ ((Palestine‘s Application for UN Membership, 2011).  
 These declarations basically confirm Palestine‘s acceptance of the previously-adopted 
UN resolutions and thus the adherence to the two-state solution. Most importantly, they 
assure the right for Palestine to gain membership; for Palestine fulfills all prerequisites to 
membership listed in the UN Charter, as it is mentioned in Article 4: ―membership in the 
United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained 
in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry 
out these obligations‖ (UN Charter). 
 Yet, the Obama Administration chose not to support this legal cause, but rather to 
―call upon both parties to refrain from proactive actions . . . and then rendered this all 
meaningless by reiterating its call for the resumption of negotiations without delay or 
preconditions‖ (Hammond, 2016, p. 363), even though the negotiations were not useful, and 
the conflict escalated much further. The real dilemma here revolves around the fact that the 
US, with all the pronounced values of freedom, engagement and global cooperation, chose 
not to provide its support to Palestine, a country that fulfills all UN membership 
preconditions, but on the other hand, the US chose to maintain its support to another country; 
Israel, which does not fulfill all UN membership preconditions; because up until this 
moment, Israel does not have specific borders and it is not a peace-loving country, taking into 
consideration the killings of innocent Palestinians, as well as the fact that many Palestinians 
in the occupied West Bank and Gaza suffer from the grave Israeli violations of international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law. Thus, the application is in effect frozen 
pending securing the needed nine votes. Thereafter, the USA veto awaits it. 
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C. Palestine’s Status Upgrade at the UN (GA Resolution 67/19) 
 A year later, Abbas addressed the GA on the 29
th
 of November 2012 and submitted a 
downgraded request to the GA for admission to the UN as a non-member observer state. This 
specific date was not randomly chosen, because it is in fact the date when the GA resolution 
181 on the partition of Palestine was passed in 1947, it is also the date when the GA passed 
resolution (32/40 B) in 1977, which ―called for the annual observance of 29 November as the 
International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People (UN website). Abdelhady explains 
this step by saying: ―because we know that everything that we are appealing for is not based 
on just desire but on international law, we are not deterred‖ (F. Abdelhady, personal 
communication, July 31, 2018). 
 This specific step came as a result of the failure in the preceding year to obtain from 
the SC its recommendation to the GA to accord Palestine the status of a member state, 
commonly known as full membership. Since the big move was not successful, a smaller one 
would not be viewed wrong, as long as it brings a favorable change in Palestine‘s status at the 
UN. In fact, this step was suggested a year ago, when Abbas submitted the application for full 
membership, as some of the EU countries opposed the full membership application yet 
supported ―a GA resolution upgrading Palestine‘s status from observer to non-member state 
on the condition that Palestinians agree not to file charges against Israel at the ICC‖ 
(Hammond, 2016, p. 353). But in 2011, this suggestion was not even accepted by the US, 
which led the EU to cancel this initiative. However, in 2012, the Palestinian leadership 
doubled their diplomatic efforts and reached out to many states to gain their support on the 
new decision for the GA non-member status. 
 According to the 67
th
 GA Plenary, there was an overwhelming support for the 
resolution (67/19): ―138 in favor to 9 against (Canada, Czech Republic, Israel, Marshall 
Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, Panama, Palau, United States), with 
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41 abstentions‖ (UN Website). Thus, the GA granted Palestine a non-member observer state 
status in the UN, documented in GA resolution 67/19, which confirms to ―accord to Palestine 
non-member observer state status in the United Nations, without prejudice to the acquired 
rights, privileges and role of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations as 
the representative of the Palestinian people, in accordance with the relevant resolutions and 
practice‖ (Resolution 67/19, 2012). However, the term ―state‖ on the new label does not 
necessarily mean that all States voting in favor of the resolution recognize Palestine as a 
State; since the multilateral recognition of Palestine as a state does not include a bilateral one. 
In fact, the resolution was supported by 138 States, while only 132 States recognized the 
State of Palestine at that time (WAFA, 2012)  
 The American negative vote came as a result to a major concern by the US as well as 
Israel that ―Palestine‘s status upgrade meant it could pursue legal actions against Israel at the 
ICC‖ (Hammond, 2016, p. 410). The Obama Administration undoubtedly viewed the 
resolution as a threat to the peace process, as the US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, 
expressed at the GA, immediately after the vote, the American denunciation of the resolution 
by saying: ―today‘s grand pronouncements will soon fade. And the Palestinian people will 
wake up tomorrow and find that little about their lives has changed, save that the prospects of 
a durable peace have only receded‖ (Rice, 2012), meaning that even when a resolution is 
adopted by the GA, the US is not obliged to accept it. Yet again, the US proves to stand 
against Palestine‘s membership in the UN and this attitude assures that Obama‘s stated policy 
regarding solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict contradicts his administration‘s actions on 
the ground. 
 In this very specific year, the American interference at the UN against Palestine was 
stronger than before since it was the elections year, and Obama wanted to secure another 
presidential term. It was understood that satisfying the large community of American 
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supporters of Israel will help Obama guarantee another presidential win, that is why Obama‘s 
attitude toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was extremely biased against Palestine on 
many levels. The latest of those attitudes was the American negative vote on resolution 
(67/19), but it was preceded by other sorts of actions; such as the American support for Israel 
during the war on Gaza in November 2012, known as: Operation Pillar of Defense. The US 
reaction to the escalation of hostilities ―was to reflexively blame the Palestinians and express 
firm support for Israel‘s violence‖ (Hammond, 2016, p. 393), claiming that the violence was 
initiated by Palestinians. Even if that was true, the US, as a mediator, should have fulfilled its 
role and focused on ending the violence, instead of producing such statements, that would 
flame the conflict up.  
 Ironically, the US keeps insisting on a bilaterally-negotiated solution to the conflict 
rather than supporting Palestine‘s UN membership, while when the conflict first started in 
1948, the US supported Israel‘s move at the UN and did not ask the Jewish leadership at that 
time to reach a negotiated agreement with the Palestinians before going to the UN. 
Accordingly, Israel achieved its independence through a UNGA resolution that was strongly 
supported by the US, simply because it is a main ally and supporting it is an American 
priority. This incident assures the double-standard attitude of the US and their willingness to 
contradict their stated values of freedom and equality, when it comes to supporting their 
allies. Therefore, Obama, during his first term, did not do much to end this double-standard 
attitude of the US; since he continued to provide a strong American support to Israel at the 
UN in a way that contradicts the American values of freedom as well as the UN main 
purpose; which is creating a peaceful and just world.  
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V. Obama and Palestine in the UN (Second Presidential Term) 
A. New Presidential Term; New UN Policy 
 In January 2013, Obama‘s presidency started its second term, and the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict remained unresolved. The American intervention in UN resolutions related to 
this conflict proved to have taken Israel‘s side rather than Palestine‘s, as Susan Rice, the 
former National Security Advisor and the US Ambassador to the UN during Obama‘s first 
administration, stated in her speech at the AJC Global Forum: ―for four and a half years at the 
UN, I did battle every day to defend Israel from a drumbeat of hostility. I was proud to lead 
that fight. The United States fought tooth and nail against the deeply-flawed Goldstone 
Report. We vigorously opposed the Human Rights Council‘s unbalanced and counter-
productive focus on Israel‖ (Rice, 2016). Such statements undermined the credibility of the 
US as a mediator; since its role was not balanced in terms of standing against all sorts of 
violence, whether it was caused by Israelis or Palestinians.  
 In fact, the US support to Israel did not initially commence during Obama‘s 
administration; because maintaining the security of Israel has been a long-term American 
national interest for almost all previous American presidents. However, during Obama‘s 
second term, politics started to have a different shape and Obama began to show some 
practical understanding for Palestinians, in attempts to fulfill the role of a true mediator rather 
than supporting one party against the other. This new American approach toward the conflict-
- led by Obama, could be a result of a few different reasons; one revolves around Obama‘s 
disappointment regarding the failure of the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks in 2013-2014, 
which were led by John Kerry, former Secretary of State. The negotiations between the 
Palestinians and the Israelis collapsed after the expiry of agreed 9-month period, 
consequently, ―the Obama administration has become openly critical of Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu‘s government.‖ (Judis, 2014). 
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 Furthermore, Obama‘s new attitude must have been a result of the fact that it was 
Obama‘s last term and there was no possibility for him to be reelected. Thus, his attitude 
need not to be influenced by the domestic policies that support Israel, the Jewish lobbying 
groups in the US, or the Republican-led Congress. In fact, Obama did call for a halt in Israeli 
settlements as well as a serious implementation of the two-state solution, but the domestic 
American politics prevented him from turning his back on Israel at the UN, and thus led his 
administration to veto any UN resolution critical of Israel, leading the latter to further pursue 
its illegal actions and prevent the birth of the two-state solution. But after years of this 
endless conflict, Obama seemed to have reached to a point, where he acknowledged that the 
conflict is nearly unsolvable and an essential change in the American policy has become a 
must.  
 In 2013, the first year of Obama‘s second term, Obama gave a speech at the GA, 
where he yet again emphasized the importance of solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 
securing a just and lasting solution that fulfills the needs of both parties. He stated: 
So now the rest of us must be willing to take risks as well. Friends of Israel, including 
the United States, must recognize that Israel‘s security as a Jewish and democratic state 
depends upon the realization of a Palestinian state, and we should say so clearly. Arab 
states, and those who supported the Palestinians, must recognize that stability will only 
be served through a two-state solution and a secure Israel‖ (Obama, 2013) 
This statement proves Obama‘s full recognition that a two-state solution is the most 
suitable way to achieve peace and bring the conflict to an end, it also shows his continued 
desire to work closely with other states to help implement this solution during his 
presidency. This attitude of Obama does not stand in line with his previous negative 
reactions to Palestinian attempts of securing UN membership in 2011 and 2012, which 
proves that a change has happened, and Obama is no longer fully against Palestine. 
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 Obama‘s language in his 2013 GA speech was full of optimism and hope as he 
spoke: ―so let‘s emerge from the familiar corners of blame and prejudice. Let‘s support 
Israeli and Palestinian leaders who are prepared to walk the difficult road to peace,‖ making 
it clear that his commitment to solving the conflict is still strong; for the long-waited 
solution is deeply desired to take place during his second administration. However, 
Obama‘s optimism started to decrease, and this was clear in his speech at the GA in the 
year after. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has not been solved like Obama hoped since he 
came to the White House, in fact, the tension escalated further; especially after the Israeli 
war on Gaza in 2014. Therefore, Obama‘s words on the conflict were surprisingly short and 
also critical of Israel, as he spoke: 
The violence engulfing the region today has made too many Israelis ready to 
abandon the hard work of peace. And that's something worthy of reflection within 
Israel. Because let‘s be clear: The status quo in the West Bank and Gaza is not 
sustainable. We cannot afford to turn away from this effort-- not when rockets are 
fired at innocent Israelis, or the lives of so many Palestinian children are taken from 
us in Gaza. (Obama, 2014) 
Such statements of Obama were different to the ones he declared in previous UN speeches. 
Obama barely took the effort to criticize Israel; therefore, such words must have irritated 
Israelis in particular, especially that the US is almost always the faithful ally to Israel at the 
UN, not the state to criticize it. Therefore, with this behavior, Obama proves to have taken a 
different approach at the UN by starting to outline the faults committed by Israel, which 
assures the fifth hypothesis of this thesis: Obama‘s policy during his second term was critical 
of Israel. 
 Nonetheless, the fact that Obama criticized Israel at some rare occasions does not 
necessarily mean abandoning the US‘s main ally in the Middle East region. Thus, few 
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months after Obama‘s speech, the US vetoed SC draft resolution (S/2014/916), which was 
introduced by Jordan on behalf of the Palestinians and affirmed ―the urgent need to reach 
within 12 months a peaceful solution to the situation in the Middle East and would have 
paved the way to a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital‖ (UN Website, 2014). 
Only eight of the SC fifteen members voted in favor, which is one vote fewer than the needed 
votes to pass a resolution with the absence of a veto by any of the SC‘s five permanent 
members. Yet, the US chose to veto this draft resolution, as Samantha Power, the US 
Ambassador to the UN at that time, explained their position by assuring the US‘s strong 
belief that bringing both parties to achieving a negotiated settlement is the best solution. She 
thus declared: ―this resolution is not one of those constructive steps‖ (UN Website, 2014), as 
the resolution will create ―more division, not compromise,‖ hinting that the UN intervention 
in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is needless; for the only way to solve it is by bilateral 
negotiations-- ignoring the fact that 21 years had then passed since the Oslo Agreement and 
the prolonged peace negotiations failed.  
 Furthermore, in her speech at the AIPAC Conference in 2015, Samantha Power 
reassured the American support to Israel at the UN and commented on that veto by saying: 
At the Security Council, we have also guarded vigilantly against any resolution that 
threatens Israel‘s security or undermines the pursuit of peace. That is why in 
December we opposed efforts to pass a deeply imbalanced Security Council 
resolution on Palestinian statehood and successfully rallied other countries to do the 
same (Power, 2015).  
This American veto came after failed efforts of John Kerry, former US Secretary of State, ―to 
line up enough abstentions from American allies like South Korea and Rwanda so that the 
United States would not have to wield its veto,‖ (Gordon & Sengupta, 2014). The Palestinian 
leadership, however should have seen it coming and postponed the vote for the following 
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month, since it will be a new cycle with new non-permanent Member States at the SC; 
including Malaysia, New Zealand and Venezuela, which are considered good friends of 
Palestine and would have provided their support to that draft resolution.  
 On the other hand, Obama‘s speech at the GA in 2015, contained enormous 
indifference to the conflict. As a matter of fact, Obama did not even refer to Israel nor 
Palestine at all in his speech. However, Obama was all focused on spreading a general notion 
of hope by saying: ―there have been too many times when, collectively, we have fallen short 
of these ideals. Over seven decades, terrible conflicts have claimed untold victims. But we 
have pressed forward, slowly, steadily, to make a system of international rules and norms 
that are better and stronger and more consistent,‖ (Obama, 2015) as well as reassuring his 
commitment to help create a global peace: ―I stand before you today believing in my core 
that we, the nations of the world, cannot return to the old ways of conflict and coercion . . . 
and if we cannot work together more effectively, we will all suffer the consequences. That 
is true for the United States, as well.‖ Obama‘s speech contained a general notion of hope 
and global cooperation with no specific remarks on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict-- like he 
used to, for he either lost hope in solving the conflict during his presidency, which was 
almost over, or because other arising conflicts in the world captured the administration‘s 
attention more than this 67-year old conflict did.  
 Again, the absence of tackling the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in Obama‘s speech 
provides hints on his growing indifference to this issue, as his second term comes to an end. 
While, on the other hand, he continues to show interest in issues related to Iran, Syria and 
Russia. In 2014, for instance, SC draft resolution (S/2014/348) on referring Syria to the ICC 
was not vetoed by the US, but by Russia and China. The US affirmative vote came as a result 
of its growing interest in that region as well as its concerns regarding Russia‘s control over it. 
Thus, they believed that an international intervention is deemed necessary in this particular 
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matter, even though this contradicts their previously-announced belief that a multilateral 
intervention in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not a suitable action.  
 
B. SC Resolution 2334 
 During Obama‘s last year as a president, his policy toward Palestine encountered a 
total change, compared to his previous 7 years in service. The US‘s double-standard attitude 
led to questioning its credibility by Arab states, and consequently endangering the American 
dominance over that region. This threat, as well as the fact that it was Obama‘s last year as a 
president, could be the reason why the US started to change its policy and call on Israel to act 
on the basis of international law. Therefore, Obama‘s language in his speech at the GA in 
2016 was harsh on Israel and its continued military occupation of the Palestinian land, as he 
said: ―Israelis and Palestinians will be better off if Palestinians reject incitement and 
recognize the legitimacy of Israel, but Israel recognizes that it cannot permanently occupy 
and settle Palestinian land. We all have to do better as leaders in tamping down, rather than 
encouraging, a notion of identity that leads us to diminish others‖ (Obama, 2016).   
 In fact, Obama tried to pressure Israel and prevent them from the construction of 
Jewish housing in East Jerusalem and the West Bank (Freedman, 2017, p. 242), which 
weakened the US-Israeli relationship, escalated the gap between Obama and Netanyahu and 
led the US to abstain on SC resolution 2334, contrary to the norm of vetoing all previous 
resolutions critical of Israel. Thus, toward the end of Obama‘s presidency-- on the 23rd of 
December 2016, SC resolution 2334 was adopted and stood out as Obama‘s farewell gift to 
Palestine, as he, for the first time during his entire presidency, stood against Israel and 
supported Palestine by abstaining on voting for the resolution.  
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The draft resolution was circulated by Egypt, the only Arab member on the SC, on the 
21
st
 of December, and Abdelhady states that when she and the Palestinian team first started 
drafting the resolution, they ―relied on the law as it is in the UN Charter and the Geneva 
Conventions, but also relied on previous UN legislations on Palestine. There was some 
political consideration in the drafting to ensure that we get the support,‖ and thus the 
resolution condemned all acts of violence against civilians including acts of terror, which 
Abdelhady confirms that they agreed to include; in order to guarantee a balanced language 
and thus a wider support, especially that ―as a matter of principle, we Palestinians oppose 
violence against civilians‖ (F, Abdelhady, personal communication, July 31, 2018). 
 However, on the evening of December 22, Egypt decided to withdraw the draft 
resolution and ―Great Britain worked quietly behind the scenes to help draw up the final 
wording of the resolution in order to secure the necessary votes‖ (Terry, 2017 p. 903). 
Finally, ―New Zealand, that had already drawn up a resolution along the same lines, joined 
by Malaysia, Senegal, and Venezuela, formally submitted the resolution‖ (p. 903). Thus, on 
the basis of this resolution, the SC reaffirmed that ―Israel‘s establishment of settlements in 
Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, had no legal validity, 
constituting a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the vision of 
two States living side-by-side in peace and security, within internationally recognized 
borders‖ (UN Website, 2016). 
Abdelhady considered that resolution as ―an insurance policy that protects us. It 
reaffirms the longstanding UN legislation on the settlements, and on the wider issue of the 
two-state solution, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and statehood‖ (F, 
Abdelhady, personal communication, July 31, 2018). In fact, the adoption of this resolution 
means that it should be respected by all states; therefore, Palestinians should take advantage 
of it at other international forums as well as the bilateral engagements, and stress on the 
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importance of its implementation.   
           Speaking of the political context that led this resolution to pass, it was clear that the 
Obama-Netanyahu relationship did not continue to be good, as Obama met with Netanyahu 
for the last time in the fall 2016, and ―their mutual distain was evident‖ (Terry, 2017, p. 901). 
This tension in the American-Israeli relationship did not happen only because of the 
continued Israeli settlement activities despite of the American reoccurring calls for a halt, but 
also because of the Iran deal; since Netanyahu was all against it. Therefore, Obama was not 
as strongly motivated to support Israel at the UN as he used to, and he chose to pressure 
Israel because of its settlement expansion by abstaining on that resolution.  
 Although this resolution passed with 14 affirmative votes, Israel chose to deny it and 
Netanyahu ―called all the ambassadors from nations that had voted for the resolution into his 
office to reprimand them personally,‖ he ―also -wrongly- blamed Obama for initiating and 
securing passage of the resolution‖ (Terry, 2017, p. 904). Obama, on the other hand, was 
fully certain that his abstention was definitely the right thing to do; as he expressed in a 
speech he has recently given on January 24, 2018, at Temple Emanu-El in New York, where 
he declared that he allowed the resolution to pass because ―the pace of Israeli settlement 
construction skyrocketed making it almost impossible to make any kind of Palestinian state,‖ 
he also added: ―voting against the resolution would have damaged our credibility on affirming 
human rights only when it's convenient, not when it has to do with ourselves and our friends‖ 
(Obama, 2018). 
 In the week following the historic vote on this resolution, on December 28, John 
Kerry delivered a major speech on the two-state solution, where he spoke about Obama‘s 
commitment to Israel and the necessity to start the implementation of the two-state solution 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In his speech, Kerry sharply declared: ―despite our best 
efforts over the years, the two-state solution is now in serious jeopardy,‖ he also stressed that 
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Israel fail to recognize that this friend, the United States of America, that has done more to 
support Israel than any other country, this friend that has blocked countless efforts to 
delegitimize Israel, cannot be true to our own values -- or even the stated democratic values 
of Israel -- and we cannot properly defend and protect Israel if we allow a viable two-state 
solution to be destroyed before our own eyes. (Kerry, 2016) 
Kerry‘s statement assures that the Obama‘s administration, represented by him in this 
speech, considers Israel‘s actions a serious threat to the two-state solution, and also 
contradictory to the American values, and that is the reason behind the US‘s abstention on 
resolution 2334, as Kerry went to say: ―and that‘s the bottom line: the vote in the United 
Nations was about preserving the two-state solution.‖ These statements may be correct but 
there are also other reasons behind Obama‘s abstention on this resolution. One could rely on 
the fact that Donald Trump, whose campaign was focused on opposing Obama‘s attempts to 
help Palestinians, won the elections as the 45
th
 of the US. Consequently, Obama was focused 
on strengthening his support to Palestine, since the president-elect is threatening of overturning 
the American approach against Palestine once he is sworn in.  
 
C. Influence of Trump’s Election on Obama’s UN Policy 
 The election of Trump was a shock to many; including Obama himself. Belonging to 
different political parties as well as having different opinions and values resulted in completely 
different presidential promises and plans. In fact, both presidents have their own different 
foreign policies, but in terms of broad strategic objectives, there is some continuity between 
the two presidential administrations, especially the aim to ―preserve the Middle East's 
regional order and help protect Israel and the Arab states against Iran and violent extremism‖ 
(Metz, 2017).  However, both presidents have different opinions on many issues; including -
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but not limited to- the Iran deal, international cooperation, and most importantly the 
Palestinian-Israel conflict; and Trump presidential campaign‘s main focus was on proving 
how flawed Obama‘s doctrine was; since he ―throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, 
railed at the ineffectiveness of Barack Obama's Middle East policy, promising that if he was 
elected there would be dramatic change‖ (Metz, 2017). 
 Hence, after Trump‘s unexpected electoral win in November 2016, Obama as well as 
others were worried of the total change in the US foreign policy, which the Trump‘s 
administration is going to implement. For instance, on the 28
th
 of November 2016, former 
American President Jimmy Carter authored an op-ed titled ‗America Must Recognize 
Palestine,‘ where he aimed at convincing Obama to face the one-state solution which Israel is 
imposing on itself and the Palestinian people, as well as emphasizing the urgent need for an 
American intervention at that point, before the new president-elect takes over, and blindly 
support Israel. In fact, Trump has given many promises to the Israeli government, but moving 
the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem was on top of his list. On the other hand, Obama 
was fully aware of the consequences of such promises and that was the main reason that 
triggered a new shift in his policy by standing with Palestinians, and thus signing a six-month 
extension of the presidential override to prevent the implementation of a Congressional 
mandate on moving the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Welsh, 2016). 
 Moreover, the UN arena is also perceived important by the new administration and 
they believed that an action against Israel at the UN was possible by the Obama 
administration. Thus, in an interview on the 20
th
 of November 2016, Former Ambassador 
John Bolton, on behalf of the President-elect, publicly warned Obama against any UN action 
that recognizes a Palestinian state‖ (Bolton, 2016). These threats did not, however, stop 
Obama from abstaining on SC resolution 2334, which disappointed many pro-Israel 
Americans and the Israeli government itself. In fact, the new administration tried to stop the 
 56 
 
resolution from passing, even before being sworn in, as ―Trump weighed into the debate,‖ 
and ―on Thursday morning, December 22, after discussions with Israelis, Egyptian President 
Abdel Fattah al- Sisi called Trump, allegedly to discuss peace plans. By Thursday afternoon, 
Egypt had withdrawn the resolution‖ (Terry, 2017, p. 903). Yet, the resolution passed since 
other countries took over Egypt‘s place as explained earlier.  
 In fact, Obama seems to have been influenced by Trump‘s announced intentions to 
stand against Palestine. This influence took various shapes; not only by supporting the 
passage of SC resolution 2334, but also by signing ―an executive order releasing $221 million 
in humanitarian aid to the Palestine Authority that had been blocked by Congress‖ (Terry, 
2017, p. 905), on his last day in office; because Trump previously threatened to cut US 
financial aid to Palestinians. This decision was not accepted by Israel nor by Trump, who 
immediately announced that he will review the decision once he officially starts his duties. 
This incident also proves the sixth hypothesis that the election of Trump influenced Obama to 
take decisions in favor of Palestine, taking into consideration that Trump‘s promises during 
his campaign were all about standing with Israel against Palestine no matter what.  
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VI.  Conclusion 
 This thesis aimed at investigating the Obama administration‘s intervention in UN 
resolutions on Palestine as well as the changes in Obama‘s UN policy toward Palestine 
during his two presidential terms. It can be concluded that Obama did interfere in UN 
resolutions on Palestine in a way that was supportive of Israel especially during his first term. 
Obama‘s first term contained several contradictions between his announced plans and his 
administration‘s actual actions on the ground. This contradiction came as a result of many 
factors: mainly the political context and the American pro-Israel lobbying groups, which 
pressured Obama to take decisions that were not in line with his announced plans. In 
addition, it can be concluded that the influence that Obama had at the UN occurred on many 
levels; either through voting against GA resolutions on Palestine, vetoing SC resolutions 
critical of Israel-- even when the other 14 members supported the draft resolution, or through 
influencing certain states not to vote for the SC draft resolution so it will not get the 9 
affirmative votes needed for it to be submitted into a vote.  
 In addition, Obama‘s strong support for Israel at the UN was vividly clear in his 
speeches as well as the speeches of Susan Rice, the US then-Ambassador to the UN. One can 
easily draw a line between the American language and the language used in preceding 
speeches by Benyamin Netanyahu and some American pro-Israel leaders, which proves that 
Obama‘s policy was indeed influenced by them. This also proves that Obama was mostly a 
Realist when it comes to issues related to the conflict; since he recognized that his potential 
to be reelected might be jeopardized if his support to Israel was not satisfying enough. Thus, 
standing against Palestine‘s applications for UN membership was an inevitable American 
decision, even though Palestine fulfills the five membership conditions as listed in the UN 
Charter. Not only did the Obama administration refuse Palestine‘s UN bid for membership, 
but also voted against GA resolution 67/19-- which granted Palestine the non-member 
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observer state status, even when a vast majority of states voted in favor.  
 However, Obama‘s attitude changed during his second term. First, his attention was 
slightly shifted to other arising conflicts in the Middle East region; secondly, his UN policy 
toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict took a different shape, since he started to criticize 
Israel for its constant illegal violations of the international law. These changes can be 
explained based on the fact that Obama accomplished the goal of being reelected and he no 
longer needs the support of the strong and influential American pro-Israel lobbying groups, 
as well as the fact that the Obama-Netanyahu relationship did not continue to be good. In 
addition, the election of Trump might have affected Obama; since Trump‘s presidential 
campaign promises were focused on criticizing Obama‘s policy on the conflict and also on 
supporting Israel against Palestine in various ways. All these factors shifted Obama‘s attitude 
to be more of a Liberal than a Realist, paying back part of his debt to the Palestinians. 
Obama‘s abstention on SC resolution 2334 during the last month of his entire tenure was a 
major disappointment for Israelis. This is due to the fact that the abstention was Obama‘s first 
clear support to Palestine at the UN, and it was also the first to pass since the Jimmy Carter, 
who voted in favor of SC resolution 465 on Israeli settlements in 1980. The 36-year old 
strong American commitment to Israel at the SC was shaken by allowing resolution 2334 to 
pass.  
 In summary, although some will claim that the changes in Obama‘s UN policy during 
his second term came a little too late and that he missed many opportunities to make a real 
difference during his 8-year presidency, yet the American abstention shows that at last, 
Obama voted his conscious in favor for a just cause. Regardless of the fact that it happened 
late, what is right was done and SC resolution 2334 gave Palestine a further internationally-
recognized legal document against the illegal violations of the Israeli government, which 
continue unabated. 
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